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1 Introduction
How individuals move between labour market states is fundamental to under-
standing the operation of labour markets. Central to this is job search behav-
iour. Individualsjob search behaviour determines which jobs they enter, how
long they spend in unemployment and when and if they change job. In recog-
nition of this job search represents one of the major research areas in modern
labour economics.
A body of research has developed that focuses specically on the methods
of job search used, in particular the use of informal job search networks (direct
contact or use of family and friends), public employment agencies and formal
methods such as answering advertisements. This paper contributes to this lit-
erature by examining the use and impact of job search methods for both unem-
ployed and employed job seekers using Australian survey data. Specically, we
examine whether job search methods vary in their e¤ectiveness, in terms of re-
ceiving a suitable job o¤er, between job searchers who are unemployed and those
who are searching on the job. Furthermore, we provide econometric evidence
on the relative association between job search methods and the quality of sub-
sequent job matches, in terms of wages and job stability, for both the employed
and unemployed. As such, it provides an expansion of research by Addison and
Portugal (2002) that analysed the job search methods of the unemployed only.
There are reasons to believe that di¤erent job search methods should have
an e¤ect on the arrival of job o¤ers. For instance, informal job search networks
may serve to alleviate information problems in the hiring process (Montgomery
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1991). It has been demonstrated that job search methods have a substantial
impact on duration of job search and, more generally, the probability of gaining
employment (Datcher 1983, Holzer 1987a, Holzer 1988, Osberg 1993, Gregg and
Wadsworth 1996, Addison and Portugal 2002, Bentolila et al 2009). Generally,
it has been found that informal job search methods are the most extensively
used job search methods and are the most e¤ective in terms of generating job
o¤ers (Holzer 1987a, Holzer 1987b, Blau and Robins 1990). A key concern in this
literature is the e¢ cacy of Public Employment Agencies (PEA). Evidence on this
is mixed. US and Canadian research indicates that PEAs are a poor source of job
o¤ers and job matches, and are related to slower transitions from unemployment
to employment (Blau and Robins 1990, Bishop 1993, Ports 1993). Addison and
Portugal (2002) reported similar ndings for Portugal. Evidence from the UK
suggests a greater e¤ectiveness of PEAs (Gregg and Wadsworth 1996).
Rather less is known about the e¤ect of job search methods on job match
quality, specically wages and job stability. In a study of the Portuguese labour
market Addison and Portugal (2002) demonstrated that the PEA is associated
with lower wages for unemployed job seekers. They also provide some evidence
that jobs found through informal job search methods have lower associated
wages than those found through advertisements. Bentolila et al (2009) also
provide evidence for the US and Europe that informal job search methods are
associated with lower wages for unemployed job seekers.
In terms of job stability, the use of family/friends is associated with longer
tenure in subsequent job matches (Datcher 1983, Simon and Warner 1992). The
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intuition behind these results is that prior information to both parties (employer
and job searcher) through informal contacts should reduce the likelihood of a
job match being revealed as poor later on. However, Loury (2006) shows that in
some cases the link between informal networks and job tenure may reect a lack
of outside opportunities for workers who gained jobs through friends/relatives.
The analysis is conducted in a number of steps. First, the impact of job
search methods on search duration is investigate using competing risk models.
Second, the e¤ect of job search methods on wages is estimated. Finally, the
analysis of job match quality is extended by examining the stability of employ-
ment according to the method through which the job was found. To summarise
our ndings, for both groups job search methods appear to a¤ect the length of
time in job search. Informal job search methods are associated with relatively
high levels of job exit (shorter search duration) when compared with formal job
search methods. Job exits through the public employment agency (PEA) dis-
play positive duration dependence for the unemployed, which may suggest that
the public employment agency is used a job search method of last resort. The
PEA is a poor source of suitable jobs for employed job seekers. Wages from jobs
found through the PEA are lower than those found through informal methods.
This provides an indication that the PEA is associated with poorer quality job
matches than informal methods. Unlike previous research we nd that the use
of informal methods, especially contacting friends/relatives, is associated with
higher wages than formal methods such as an answering advertisements. Re-
sults on job stability vary markedly by whether the job seeker was employed
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or unemployed. For the unemployed, job nding through friends/relatives is
associated with less stable employment. Conversely, employed job seekers who
found work through friends/relatives were less likely to leave that job.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. The following section
provides background information on the data used. Section 3 outlines the em-
pirical methodology, section 4 discusses the results and the nal section provides
a conclusion and summary.
2 Background and Data
The data source used is the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Survey of
Employment and Unemployment Patterns (herein referred to as SEUP). SEUP
covers the period from the start of September 1994 to the end of August 1997.
The survey was conducted in three waves:
1. Wave 1: 5th September 1994 to 3rd September 1995;
2. Wave 2: 4th September 1995 to 1st September 1996; and
3. Wave 3: 2nd September 1996 to 31st August 1997.
Whilst 7,572 people were originally interviewed, the sample size was reduced
by attrition to 6,056 by the end of wave 3. Individuals selected for the survey
were aged 15-59 and living in a private residence as at May 1995. SEUP has
an unusual sample framework. Respondents were split into two subgroups, Job-
seekers and a Population Reference Group (PRG). The PRG is a random sample
of the population, the Jobseekers group oversamples those who are unemployed,
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it comprises individuals who were considered to be potential candidates for a
labour market program at the time of recruitment (Le and Miller 1998). It
must be noted that the PRG and Jobseeker group are not mutually exclusive,
the PRG contains some Jobseekers.
Two samples are generated by stratifying those respondents who were ac-
tively in the labour force into those who were unemployed and those who were
employed at the start of SEUP.1 Appendix Table A1 provides summary statis-
tics on the 2,534 individuals who were unemployed and the 3,581 individuals
who were employed at the commencement of SEUP.
INSERT TABLE 1
Our starting point is to examine ex ante job search method use. Table 1
provides preliminary evidence on job search methods used by the unemployed.
A similar analysis cannot be conducted for employed job searchers as job search
methods are not recorded in SEUP whilst an individual is employed. In line
with existing studies we group job nding methods into 5 main categories, direct
employer approach, advertisement, Public Employment Agency (PEA), Friends
or Relatives and Other job search methods. Similar to evidence for the UK
and Portugal (Gregg and Wadsworth 1996, Addison and Portugal 2002), reg-
istering with the PEA is the most frequently used job search method by the
unemployed. Direct employer contact is also frequently used, with the methods
friends and relatives and answering newspaper advertisements less frequently
used. The third and fourth columns provide an indication of the relative e¤ec-
1 Individuals who were not in the labour force at the start of SEUP are excluded from the
analysis.
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tiveness of di¤erent search methods. Overall job nding rates seem quite high
when compared to existing research, this reects the di¤erent time period of
analysis in this study. That is, job nding rates are taken across a three year
period whereas most existing research is based on quarterly or yearly surveys.2
Australian job seekers do not generally follow a single strategy for seeking a job.
On average, an unemployed individual used 2.8 di¤erent search methods during
their unemployment spell. This is in line with existing evidence that suggests
job seekers use multiple job search strategies.3
INSERT TABLE 2
Next we examine ex post job nding methods for both the unemployed and
employed. For all employment episodes a job nding method is recorded. Table
2 displays summary statistics on the outcomes of the job match generated by
each search method according to whether the individual was initially employed
or unemployed. Substantial variation in average wage by job search method is
apparent for both unemployed and employed job searchers. For the unemployed,
nding a job by direct approach is associated with the highest average wage of
approximately 416 dollars a week whereas for on-the-job searchers nding em-
ployment via advertisement is the most lucrative (427 dollars a week). On-the-
job searchers receive a markedly higher average wage from jobs found through
friends or relatives than the unemployed (339 dollars compared to 281 dollars).
Gaining employment by use of the PEA is associated with an average wage of
2For instance Addison and Portugal (2002) report quarterly job nding rates (correspond-
ing to column 4 of Table 5.2) that range from 1.5% for the PEA to 7.5% for friends/relatives.
3Both Blau and Robins (1990) and Addison and Portugal (2002) report unemployed indi-
viduals using 2.1 di¤erent search methods on average.
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368 dollars for the unemployed, but for the employed PEA job matches generate
clearly inferior wages (328 dollars). This could reect the greater potential for
adverse selection of employed job seekers who use the PEA (compared to the
unemployed). Unlike unemployed job searchers, direct approach is associated
with a relatively low wage for employed job searchers. Di¤erences in (censored)
average tenure by job search method exist, but these are not marked.4 There is
some evidence that the PEA is associated with shorter tenure jobs. Generally,
tenure variations follow the same pattern evident for average wages.
3 Methodology:
3.1 Modelling Transitions to Employment via Multiple
Job Search Methods
For both the unemployed and employed at the start of SEUP we observe re-
spondents who have been in this state for some period of time. We denote this
duration of time for individual i as ai. We then observe some duration (bi) in
unemployment or employment, respectively, until either the individual exits to
a new job or SEUP ends. In the case of employed job searchers they may also
exit to unemployment/not in the labour force. In any of these cases, excluding
movement to a new job, this spell is treated as censored at that point. Hence,
total duration until exit can be specied as di = ai + bi that is either censored
or uncensored. The individual likelihood contribution is given by
4Tenure data is censored due to the relatively short time period of SEUP.
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Li = ci lnhi (ai + bi) +
ai+bi-1X
t=ai+1
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This species a single risk model where the 0s are interpreted as the log of
a non-parametric piece-wise linear baseline hazard. The data form a panel with
each individual supplying j = 1; 2:::di observations. Each exit state denotes an
exit to employment via a di¤erent job search method. For each exit state, all
observations are zero except the last, where the last is unity only if the individual
exits to that state. Hence, there is a hazard for each j for each individual exit
state of which there are 6. As a result the data forms an unbalanced panel.
In this analysis we use 16 duration intervals for analysis. These intervals cover
30 quarters (7.5 years), where the rst 12 intervals are quarterly, due to data
thinning the last 4 intervals cover longer periods.
Equation (1) is estimated separately for each exit state. We assume pro-
portional hazards and so the covariates a¤ect the hazard through the comple-
mentary log-log link. In an attempt to control for unobserved heterogeneity a


























Following Andrews et al (2002), we note that the coe¢ cient estimates on the
covariates in these competing risk regressions are di¢ cult to interpret. The exit
risk to state m (m) and the expected waiting time until exit via risk m (Em)




















Where s is the survival function at time t.
Hence, we estimate the probability of exit via state m conditional on exiting
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The baseline hazards used to compute the probabilities are:
bmt = 1- exp h- expnx0b + bmtoim = 1; 2; :::;M: (5)
where x is the sample mean. In the empirical chapters we report the marginal











3.2 Wages and Job Search Methods
Initially for both groups we estimate a simple OLS regression for both the
unemployed and employed sample of the impact of job search methods on wages:
lnwi = 0 + 1Xi + 2Ji + 3JSMi + i (7)
The dependent variable is generated dividing weekly wage by hours worked
and then taking its natural log. Xi is a vector of personal characteristics, Ji
is a vector workplace characteristics and JSMi is a range of dummy variables
indicating the method through which the job was found (job nding through
the PEA is used as the omitted case).5
Wages are only observed for those of the unemployed who successfully transit
to employment. Those who make the transition to employment are unlikely to
be a random subsample of the unemployed in terms of unobservables. As a
result, OLS wage regressions may generate biased estimates of the impact of
job search methods (and all other covariates) on wages. To address this we
estimate log hourly wage regressions using a two-stage approach that seeks to
control for bias due to sample selectivity (Heckman 1979). This takes the form
of an initial selection model into employment (E):
Ei = 0 + 1Xi + 2Ji + 3Zi + i (8)
5As individuals who enter self-employment often do not record a wage, and this wage
may not reect all job related earnings (such as prots), we exclude those who exited to
self-employment from these regressions.
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Where Xi is a vector of personal characteristics, Ji is a vector workplace
characteristics and Zi are the instrumental variables used to identify the two
equation model. The wage regression is simply (7) above.
In the case where the error terms in the two equations are correlated, i.e.
corr(i; i) 6= 0, unobservable characteristics a¤ecting the likelihood of nding
employment also inuence subsequent wage determination and (7) is mispeci-
ed. In principle the standard Heckman selection approach does not require an
instrumental variable approach per se, instead identication is possible through
the inverse mills ratio alone. Nonetheless, we choose to adopt an instrumental
variable approach. This requires a valid instrument for gaining employment
to be used in the second stage wage regression. Despite the range of informa-
tion available in SEUP, it was di¢ cult to nd a variable that was unrelated to
wages but strongly predictive of gaining employment. We use duration of time
in unemployment. The expectation of a link between wages and time in search
is unclear. There are two theoretical reasons why time in unemployment may
be related to subsequent wages. First, all else equal longer periods of search
increase the probability of gaining a higher wage o¤er. If individuals reserva-
tion wages are stationary and they accept the rst suitable job o¤er (i.e. they
adopt a stopping rule) then this may weaken any link between time in search
and wages in their rst post-unemployment job. Second, if replacement ratios
of unemployment benets decline over time in unemployment this may cause
unemployed job seekers to revise their reservation wage downwards. This is less
problematic as replacement ratios were constant over time in unemployment in
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Australia at the time of SEUP. Hence, there exist no direct reason why time in
unemployment should inuence reservation wages. Tests of instrument validity
are discussed when the estimates are presented in section 4.1.
Likewise, not all employed individuals change job and this will bias para-
meter estimates in the case where those individuals who are observed to have
moved job are not a random subsection of all employed workers. In the case of
the employed there is an added dimension, that is we might be more interested
in the e¤ect of job search methods on the change of wage rate between the
initial and subsequent job. This provides a measure of the benet of changing
job using a particular job search method. Although SEUP is structured into
three waves, its episodic nature means that we can, in e¤ect, observe the em-
ployment status, and if they are employed, the wages and employment details
of an individual at any point in time within these three waves. This information
can be used to construct a xed interval panel data set of wages. The structure
of SEUP allows the specication of any frequency interval of observation up to
daily. However, we need to nd a trade-o¤between increasing the number of ob-
servations (by using higher frequency intervals) and variability in wages and job
search method. To determine an optimal interval length a number of di¤erent
intervals were utilised, ranging from monthly through to yearly observations.
We settle on the use of half yearly intervals in the subsequent analysis.
A benet from moving to a panel estimation approach is the ability to intro-
duce individual xed e¤ects in an attempt to control for unobserved individual
heterogeneity that may bias point estimates of the wage premia associated with
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di¤ering job search methods. In this approach the wage e¤ects of job search
methods are identied separately from the individual xed e¤ects by those indi-
viduals who move jobs between periods (and use di¤erent job search methods to
do this). A number of other time-varying covariates are included in the regres-
sion, such as occupation and industry, to control for other di¤erences between
jobs taken by a given individual. This leads to the following equation:
lnwit = i + 0 + 1JSMit + 2Xit + 3Wit + "it; t = 1; 2; :::; 13 (9)
Where i is an individual level time invariant error term and "it is a standard
I.I.D. error term with zero mean and constant variance. JSM is a vector of job
search methods, X andW are vectors of time varying individual and workplace
characteristics, respectively.
4 Results - Duration of Job Search
INSERT FIGURE 1 AND 2
Figure 1 and 2 present the estimated baseline hazards for exits from un-
employment and employment, respectively. These are displayed for each job
nding method, and in each case the baseline hazard estimates are reported for
the models estimated with (solid lines) and without (dashed lines) a gamma
frailty term for unobserved heterogeneity. These hazards are generated from
complementarity log-log estimates of probability to exit unemployment to each
exit state separately, where the inclusion of 16 interval dummies provide point
14
estimates of the hazard of exit across these intervals. Hence, the baseline hazards
provide the duration conditional probability of exit to each state once observ-
able, and for the solid lines, unobservable characteristics have been controlled
for. Not all employed individuals are engaged in job search; SEUP provides in-
formation on whether the individual was engaged in job search. One approach
would be to exclude all employed individuals who did not report engaging in
job search. However, employment to employment transitions occur even when
individuals do not report job search activity. As a result our choice of approach
is to include a control for whether the employed individual was actively seeking
work.
We focus on the baseline hazards results from the heterogenous models. For
the unemployed both direct approach and the use of friends/relatives there is
some evidence of positive duration dependence. This suggests that unemployed
job seekers do not appear to exhaust e¤ective informal job networks relatively
early during an unemployment spell. The baseline hazards for exits through the
PEA and other methods also exhibit positive duration dependence. Thomas
(1997) suggests that the baseline hazard generally reported for exit via the
PEA pattern may reect timing of job search method use by the unemployed.
That is, if the use of the PEA is seen as a source of poorer quality job matches,
the baseline hazard for the exit to PEAs will be biased downwards in the earlier
period of job search. Our baseline hazard for exits via the PEA provides some
support for this view as it relatively low early in the search period. The hazard
to exit via advertisement is essentially at and near zero for unemployed job
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seekers.
Employed searchers exits via the two informal job search methods, direct
approach and friends/relatives, increase markedly in the rst 10 to 20 months.
Again it does not seem that employed job searchers exhaust informal job search
networks that will generate acceptable job o¤ers early in the search period.
Exits via advertisement are again very low, although there is some increase
with duration. Finally, it appears that the PEA is a relatively poor source of
acceptable job o¤ers for the employed. This is reected in a consistently low
exit probability via this method.
INSERT TABLE 3 & 4
Covariate estimates from the competing risks models are presented in Tables
3 and 4 for the unemployed and employed sample, respectively. For each exit
state and covariate, the raw coe¢ cient, estimated marginal e¤ect of probability
of exit and standard error are reported. For the sake of brevity, we omit the
results for exits to self-employment, which cannot be considered as a job nding
method per se.6 In the following discussion we focus on the estimated marginal
e¤ects of probability of exit to each risk state. These, unlike the raw estimates,
provide a measure of the impact of a given covariate on the likelihood of exit to
a given risk state taking into account all other risk states.
Looking rst at the unemployed sample, there are noticeable age e¤ects.
Those aged 25 years or older are less likely to exit via friends/relatives (from
-9 to -14 percentage points), and those 30 years or older are also less likely
6Moreover, due to the relatively small numbers of individuals exiting to self-employment,
covariate estimates for this exit state were not statistically signicant at standard levels.
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to nd employment through the PEA. Those 50 years or older are 9, 7 and 4
percentage points more likely to exit to employment through direct approach
to the employer, through other methods and through adverts, respectively. The
pattern of the age coe¢ cients for both friends/relatives and PEAs indicates
that the likelihood of exiting to employment via these methods declines with
age. The PEA appears to best serve younger unemployed job seekers.
Educational qualications have marked e¤ects on job nding methods for the
unemployed. Those with high school completion as their highest qualication
level are 5 per cent more likely to gain employment through friends/relatives,
and marginally more likely to gain employment through other methods or exit to
self-employment. Degree holders are more likely to exit to employment through
direct approach. Unemployed individuals with disabilities were less likely to
exit to employment through direct approach, friends/relatives or the use of
advertisements, but more likely to exit through other methods or the use of the
PEA. This latter result suggests that PEAs have an important role in nding
work for individuals who might experience di¢ culties in gaining employment
through other methods.
For the employed sample a number of additional covariates are included such
as dummy variables for occupation type and industry of employment. Addition-
ally, a dummy variable (looking for work) is included that signies the individual
was actively seeking work in the sample period. The age patterns evident for
the employed are di¤erent to those seen for the unemployed. For instance, older
employed individuals are less likely to move job by direct approach. In addition,
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the inverse age relationship for job nding through friends/relatives is no longer
apparent.
There are associations between occupation and job search methods. Profes-
sionals/managers are 13 percentage points less likely to exit through the use of
friends/relatives. This may indicate a lesser role for informal job networks in
professional and managerial occupations insofar as more formalised job applica-
tion processes may be commonplace in these occupations. It is possible though
that we do not capture the case where formal job applications are required
by law, but information about the job are passed through informal networks.
Across all job nding methods, there are no signicant industry e¤ects on exit to
employment. Although a number of coe¢ cients are signicant for exit through
the PEA, generally the marginal e¤ects are very small.
4.1 Job Match Quality
The evidence presented so far sheds light on the role of job search methods in
both the unemployed to employed transition, and the transition between jobs.
This section examines job match quality related to di¤erent job nding methods.
Specically, we examine the relationship with wages and with job stability.
INSERT TABLE 5
Column 1 of Table 5 displays OLS wage estimates for unemployed job seekers.
The results suggest that unemployed job searchers who gain employment by
direct approach gain an hourly wage premium of 14 per cent above those who
gain employment through use of the PEA. The corresponding premium for the
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use of friends/relatives is 11 per cent, while there is a 7 per cent premium for
those who use other methods. There is no evidence that employment gained
via advertisement is associated with a higher hourly wage than through the use
of the PEA. Column 2 has the corresponding OLS estimates for the employed
sample. The wage premia associated with the two informal job search methods
relative to the PEA is essentially the same for on the job searchers, between 12
and 13 percent. The key di¤erence is that there is also a premium associated
with job nding through advertisements of 14 percent.
As mentioned in section 3 these results are potentially biased by non-random
sample selection. This potential bias is examined using a Heckman two stage
selection model. This model is instrumented by unemployment duration prior to
gaining employment. This is negatively related to the probability of gaining em-
ployment (p-value < 0.001). To test for the exclusion validity of the instrument
in the wage equation a necessary compromise was to estimate (8) by OLS so
as to retrieve the residuals. This test indicates that the instrument is (weakly)
exogenous to log wages.7 Corrected wage estimates for the unemployed are re-
ported in column 3 Table 4 suggests that while there was some slight bias in the
earlier OLS parameter estimates, all estimates of job search method e¤ects on
wages remain with 0.01 of the OLS estimates. These results suggest that the use
of informal job search methods (direct approach and friends/relatives) gener-
ates substantially higher hourly wages for the unemployed than formal methods.
They do not support previous evidence that the use of friends and relatives gen-
7F(1,1552) = 2.02, p-value = 0.156.
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erates lower wages than formal job search methods for the unemployed (Addison
and Portugal 2002, Bentolila et al 2009).
Estimates from the xed e¤ects wage regression for the employed are pre-
sented in column 4, Table 5. The results for the impact of job search methods
di¤er markedly from the cross-sectional OLS estimates. The wage premia asso-
ciated with direct approach or advertisements are no longer statistically signif-
icant. This may indicate that the OLS estimates for these covariates may have
been spurious, although in the case of direct approach it may reect the impre-
cision of the xed e¤ects estimates. The premium associated with the use of
friends/relatives maintains its signicance and roughly doubles in magnitude.
Hence, the wage return to this form of job search by the employed does not
appear to be a result of time invariant individual unobserved characteristics.
Together these results indicate distinctly di¤erent e¤ects of job search methods
than were suggested by the summary statistics presented in table 2. These are
new results and there is no comparative evidence available.
Do these results di¤er by gender? In unreported estimates for unemployed
males we nd that the Heckman corrected wage estimates of job search methods
association with wages is essentially the same as for the pooled sample. Simi-
larly, the xed e¤ects estimates of job search methods for employed males are
also proximate to those reported for the pooled sample. With females we are
hampered by a fairly small number of observations and unable to gain precise
estimates. Nonetheless the male estimates suggests that the wage returns to job
search methods do not vary substantially by gender for either unemployed or
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employed job searchers.
We now examine job stability and search methods. Search methods that lead
to superior quality job matches should, on average, be associated with longer
subsequent job durations. It is in the interest of employers and employees to
terminate poor quality job matches, and the less satisfactory the job match the
shorter the expected time period until it is revealed as poor. Hence, a posi-
tive relationship between job duration and job match quality might be expected
(Jovanovic 1979, Pries 2004). Table 6 provides summary statistics on the du-
ration of the rst job found (for the unemployed) and the rst job moved to
(for the employed) split by the job nding method through which the job was
gained. The job duration gures need to be viewed with some caution as some
job episodes will be censored at the end of the sample period of SEUP. Hence
the mean gures displayed are subject to observation bias. To aid analysis, the
proportion of individuals who had left this job before the end of the sample
period is also provided. Finally, we also report the reason why the individual
left the job.
INSERT TABLE 6
For the unemployed, those who found employment by direct approach or
advertisement have longer expected job durations than those who found their
job by other methods, friends/relatives or the PEA. Job nding via the PEA
is associated with substantially lower average job duration, some 65 days less
than those jobs found by direct approach. Additionally, 89 per cent of the unem-
ployed who used the PEA to gain employment subsequently left this job during
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the sample period. This suggests that the average employment duration (178
days) is subject to less severe observation bias for this job search method. The
corresponding gure for direct approach is that 75 per cent left the job within
the sample period, which suggests greater censoring, and hence, a greater poten-
tial for observation bias. This means that the di¤erence in employment episode
durations between direct approach and PEAs is likely to be a downwardly bi-
ased estimate. Marked di¤erences exist in the reason for job loss/quit across job
nding methods. For instance, 27 per cent and 25 per cent of those who found
employment through friends/relatives and the PEA were red (left involuntar-
ily), respectively. In contrast, for all other job nding methods the proportion
red ranged between 17 and 21 percent.
The patterns of job loss and job duration di¤er for employed job searchers.
Employed job searchers who gain a job through direct approach or the PEA
subsequently have the lowest average job duration. The proportion of job to
job movers who subsequently leave their jobs in sample are generally lower than
that for the unemployed to job movers. Due to this, the average job duration
gures for employed job searchers should be viewed with caution. In contrast to
the results for the unemployed, those who found work through friends/relatives
were less likely to leave that job than for all other job nding methods except
othermethods.
INSERT TABLE 7
The link between job nding methods and job stability is examined in a mul-
tivariate setting using duration analysis. In particular, we consider the impact
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of job search methods on two exit states, involuntary exits (res)8 and voluntary
exits (quits).9 Competing risk models are estimated for both the unemployed
and employed job searcher samples, with 7 duration parameters. Table 7 dis-
plays covariate estimates for voluntary and involuntary exits from the rst job
for the unemployed at start sample and the second job for the sample who were
initially employed. The omitted category is that the job was found through the
PEA.
For those initially unemployed, job nding through friends/relatives or other
methods is associated with an increased likelihood of involuntary job loss when
compared to job nding using the PEA. Job nding through friends/relatives,
along with the use of advertisements, is also associated with increased likelihood
of quitting. Together, these results suggest that for the unemployed the use of
friends/relatives is associated with less stable employment. Hence, this method,
whilst useful in gaining employment, may provide less desirable (in the long
term) and/or less stable employment. The estimates for the employed sample
suggest that jobs found via direct approach are associated with a heightened
risk of being red from that job. Again this provides evidence that informal job
search methods are associated with less stable employment.
8 It is perhaps unclear how temporary/seasonal exits should be treated as perhaps these
may have an involuntary component. In the following empirical work we include these as
involuntary exits. Unreported estimates demonstrate that their incluson/exclusion does not
materially a¤ect the estimates of job search method e¤ects.




Using Australian survey data this paper has examined the role of search methods
on job nding and subsequent job match quality for unemployed and employed
job seekers separately. Specically, we have focused on the e¤ect of job nding
methods on time in search, wage determination in any subsequent job, and the
duration and stability of these jobs. Along with providing the rst evidence
for Australia, it extends previous work by Addison and Portugal (2002) by
examining the impact of job nding methods on match quality for employed job
searchers. A number of ndings can be highlighted.
There appear to be marked di¤erences in the impact of job search methods on
time in search between unemployed and employed job searchers. The likelihood
of exit from search is generally higher via friends/relatives or direct approach
than it is for using advertisements or the PEA. The PEA appears to be a poor
source of jobs, and a source of poor jobs. The evidence provided in Table 1
for instance suggests that the two informal job search methods, direct approach
and friends/relatives are associated with greater job nding success. In terms of
individual characteristics of job searchers, the PEA is a relatively poor source
of jobs particularly for older workers and females. As noted by Thomas (1997)
negative results for the e¢ cacy of job search through PEAs may just reect
an unobserved timing dimension to job search. Hence, the estimated likelihood
(hazard) of job nding through the PEA may biased downwards in the earlier
periods of job search. The extent of this bias cannot be directly assessed using
our data. Instead, we demonstrate that jobs found through the PEA are, in
24
general, associated with lower wages. For instance, they are associated with a
lower wage than job nding through all other methods except advertisements.
This is true for both unemployed and employed job seekers. There is also some
evidence that PEA found jobs are associated with subsequent shorter durations.
25
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Table 1: Summary of Job Search Methods, Unemployed Job Searchers
Number Using Number (%) Number (%) using job search
Method Finding Job method that report job
Job Search Method nding by that method
Direct Employer Contact 2307 1576 (68.3) 478 (20.7%)
Advertisement 1042 739 (70.9) 62 (6.0%)
PEA 2403 1592 (66.3) 307 (12.8%)
Friends / Relatives 1203 843 (70.1) 248 (20.6%)
Other 411 302 (73.5) 32 (7.8%)
Average Number of Search Methods Used = 2.79
Number of Observations = 2,543
Source: SEUP.
31
Table 2: Tenure and Wages, Destination Job
Unemployed
Direct Approach Advertisement PEA Friends/Relatives Other
Tenure (days) 186 172 157 175 167
Weekly Wage ($AUD) 415.80 389.52 368.42 281.14 338.12
Observations 1559
Employed
Tenure (days) 261 304 251 282 281



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Wage Estimates, Destination Job
Unemployed Employed Heckman - Unemployed FE Employed
Direct Approach 0.14*[0.03] 0.13*[0.04] 0.14* [0.04] 0.07[0.05]
Friends/Relatives 0.11*[0.03] 0.12*[0.04] 0.10* [0.04] 0.24*[0.05]
Advertisement 0.02[0.05] 0.14*[0.05] -0.01 [0.05] 0.002 [0.06]
Other 0.07**[0.03] 0.15*[0.04] 0.05 [0.04]
Constant 2.10*[0.08] 1.85* [0.09]
r2 0.12 0.24 0.06
Observations 1559 1336 1559 21697 (4576 individuals)
Note: [ ] are Huber-White robust standard errors. *,**,*** indicate statistical signicance at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively .










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1: Summary Statistics by Employment Status at Start of SEUP
Unemployed Employed
Age:
15 to 19 0.11 0.08
20 to 24 0.16 0.15
25 to 29 0.12 0.13
30 to 34 0.11 0.13
35 to 39 0.12 0.15
40 to 44 0.11 0.12
45 to 49 0.09 0.10
50 to 59 0.16 0.13
Male 0.62 0.55
Less Than High School 0.56 0.41
High School 0.16 0.16
Basic Vocational Training 0.06 0.06





Working Partner 0.17 0.37
Non Working Partner 0.23 0.13
Capital City 0.46 0.51
Urban Area 0.28 0.24
Rural Area 0.26 0.25
Work Experience (years) 12.11 13.80
Never Had a Job 0.14 N/A
Observations 2534 3581
Source: SEUP.
38
